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The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,
and the Fight Against Terrorism
AHARON BARAK*
Owen M. Fiss is my friend. From him I learned the meaning of
friendship. Owen is my educator. He taught me the meaning of princi-
pled attitude toward judging. He opened before me the world of values
and the role of the judge in giving meaning to those values. He led me
in the development of my theories of interpretation - objectivity in
interpretation - based on shared values of the legal community. For all
that and for much more - this paper is dedicated.
A. The Role of a Supreme Court
I see my role as a judge of a supreme court in a democracy as the
protection of the constitution and of democracy.' We cannot take the
continued existence of a democracy for granted. This is certainly the
case for new democracies, but it is also true of the old and well-estab-
lished ones. The approach that "it cannot happen to us" can no longer
be accepted. Anything can happen. If democracy was perverted and
destroyed in the Germany of Kant, Beethoven and Goethe, it can happen
anywhere. If we do not protect democracy, democracy will not protect
us. I do not know if the supreme court judges in Germany could have
prevented Hitler from coming to power in the 1930s. But I do know that
one of the lessons of the Holocaust and of the Second World War is the
need to have democratic constitutions and ensure that they are put into
effect by supreme court judges whose main task is to protect democracy.
It was this awareness that, in the post-World War II era, helped dissemi-
nate the idea of judicial review of legislative action and make human
rights central.2 It led to the recognition of defensive democracy3 and
* President of the Supreme Court of Israel. This article is based on selections from Aharon
Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 16 (2002). In that piece, I discussed my judicial philosophy. I tried to demonstrate how
that philosophy is implemented in the context of the fight against terrorism.
1. For a comprehensive analysis of my thesis, see Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on
Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002).
2. See generally Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 45 (1971);
Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (Douglas Greenberg et
al. eds., 1993); The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds.,
1995); Marina Angel, Constitutional Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Law
Symposium, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 287 (1983).
3. See E.A. 1/65, Yardor v. Chairman of Cent. Elections Comm. for Sixth Knesset, 19(3)
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even militant democracy.4 And it shaped my perspective, that the main
role of the supreme court judge in a democracy is to maintain and pro-
tect the constitution and democracy. As I noted in one of my opinions:
The struggle for the law is unceasing. The need to watch over the
rule of law exists at all times. Trees that we have nurtured for many
years may be uprooted with one stroke of the axe. We must never
relax the protection of the rule of law. All of us - all branches of
government, all parties and factions, all institutions - must protect
our young democracy. This protective role is conferred on the judici-
ary as a whole, and on the Supreme Court in particular. Once again
we, the judges of this generation, are charged with watching over our
basic values and protecting them against those who challenge them.'
This approach - so I believe - is common to many supreme
court judges in modem democracies. Judicial protection of democracy
in general, and of human rights in particular, characterizes the develop-
ment of most modem democracies.6 The phenomenon is general, the
result of the events that occurred during World War II and the Holo-
caust. Legal literature mostly analyzes this phenomenon in terms of an
increase in judicial power relative to other powers in society.7 This
analysis confuses purpose with result. The purpose of this modem
P.D. 365 (Isr.). This case addressed the question whether the court could proscribe a party that
denied the existence of the "State of Israel" from participating in the electoral process. This
question arose because the relevant legislation did not include any express provision on the matter.
The court held that such a party could not participate in the electoral process. For the majority,
Justice Sussman wrote:
The said basic supra-legal rules are merely, in this matter, the right of the organized
society in the State to protect itself. Whether we call these rules "natural law" to
indicate that they are the law of the State by virtue of its nature ... or whether we
call them by another name, I agree with the opinion that the experience of life
requires us not to repeat the same mistake to which we were all witness ... As for
myself, with regard to Israel, I am prepared to satisfy myself with "defensive
democracy," and we have tools to protect the existence of the State, even if we do
not find them set out in the Elections Law.
A few years later - after additional case law that restricted this power only to a party that denied
the existence of the State but not its democratic nature, E.A. 2/84, Neiman v. Chairman of Cent.
Elections Comm. for Eleventh Knesset, 39(2) P.D. 225 - the Knesset amended its Basic Law,
enacting an express provision to this effect.
4. In contemporary Germany, the militant democracy (streitbare Demokratie) is one of the
foundations of the constitutional structure. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTrru-rON OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 213 (1994); DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 37 (2d ed. 1997).
5. H.C. 5364/94, Velner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labor Party, 49(1) P.D. 758, 808
(internal citations omitted).
6. See Michael Kirby, Australian Law - After 11 September 2001, 21 AUSTL. B. REV. 21
(2001); Sir Anthony Mason, A Bill of Rights for Australia?, 5 AUSTL. B. REV. 79, 80 (1989);
Beverley McLachlin, The Role of the Supreme Court in the New Democracy 13-15 (2001)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
7. See The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, supra note 2, at 1-5.
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development is not to increase the power of the court in a democracy.
The purpose is the protection of democracy and human rights. An
increase in judicial power is a side effect, since judicial power is one of
many factors in preserving democratic balance.
Democracy means the rule of the people, acting through their repre-
sentatives in the legislature. It is therefore essential to democracy that
free elections are held periodically for the election of representatives on
the basis of a political program proposed by them, and that they are
accountable to the people, who can, if they so desire, periodically
replace them.8 Hence the connection between democracy and legislative
supremacy. However, real or substantive democracy, as opposed to
merely formal democracy, is not satisfied by the presence of these con-
ditions. Democracy has its own internal morality, based on the dignity
and equality of all human beings. Thus, in addition to formal require-
ments, there must also be substantive requirements. These are reflected
in the supremacy of certain underlying values and principles based on
human dignity, equality, and tolerance.9 There is no (real) democracy
without recognition of values and principles such as morality and jus-
tice. Above all, democracy cannot exist without the protection of indi-
vidual human rights that the majority cannot take away by force of its
numerical superiority.' ° Real democracy is not just the law of rules and
legislative supremacy. Democracy is a multidimensional concept. It
requires recognition of the power of the majority and limitations on the
power of the majority. It is based on legislative supremacy and the
supremacy of values, principles and human rights. When there is inter-
nal conflict, the formal and substantive elements of democracy must be
balanced, to protect the essence of each of the aspects of democracy. In
this balance, limitations are placed both on legislative supremacy and on
the supremacy of human rights.
With that approach to my role as a judge I will turn to the role a
supreme court should play when a democratic state launches a war on
terror. In doing so, I will refer to the Israeli Supreme Court's experience
in dealing with that problem. My aim is not to discuss specific cases or
specific results. My aim is to lay down a way of thinking about the
judicial role in times of terror.
B. The Supreme Court and the Problem of Terrorism
1. TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY
Terrorism plagues many countries. The United States realized ter-
8. See ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 95-96 (1998).
9. See RONALD DWORKIN, A BILL OF RiGrrs FOR BRITAIN 35-36 (1990).
10. Lord Woolf, Droit Public - English Style, PUB. L. 57, at 68-69; McLachlin, supra note 6.
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rorism's devastating power on September 11, 2001. Other countries
such as Israel have suffered from terrorism for a long time. 1 While
terrorism poses difficult questions for every country, it poses especially
difficult questions for democracies, where not every effective measure
for preventing or punishing acts of terrorism can be used. I discussed
this in one case, in which the Supreme Court of Israel held that violence
(torture) in interrogation of a suspected terrorist is not permitted, even if
using violence may save human life by preventing impending terrorist
acts:
We are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with that real-
ity. This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable
to it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it.
Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its
back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law
and recognition of an individual's liberty constitutes an important
component in its understanding of security. At the end of the day,
they strengthen its spirit and its strength and allow it to overcome its
difficulties. 12
Terrorism creates much tension between the components of democracy.
One pillar of democracy - the rule of the people through their elected
representatives - may encourage the taking of all steps effective in
fighting terrorism, even if the impact on human rights is harmful. The
other pillar of democracy - human rights - may encourage protecting
the rights of every individual, including the terrorist, even at the cost of
undermining the fight against terrorism. Struggling with this tension is
primarily the task of the legislature, and the executive, both of which are
accountable to the people. But the legislature and the executive must act
within the constitutional and legislative scheme - a scheme that is sub-
ject to judicial review.
We, judges in modem democracies, have a major role to play in
protecting democracy. We should protect it both from terrorism and
from the means that the state wants to use to fight terrorism. Judges are,
of course, tested daily in their protection of democracy, but judges meet
their supreme test when they face situations of war and terrorism. The
protection of human rights of every individual is a duty much more for-
midable in situations of war or terrorism than in times of peace and
security. If we fail in our role during times of war and terrorism, we will
be unable to fulfill our role during times of peace and tranquility. It is a
11. For a comparison of the American experience and the Israeli experience, see William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Time of Security Crises,
18 ISR. YEARBOOK HUM. RTS. 11(1988).
12. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel. v. Gov't of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817,
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myth to think that it is possible to maintain a sharp distinction between
the status of human rights during a period of war and the status of
human rights during a period of peace. It is self-deception to believe
that we can limit our judicial ruling so that they will be valid only during
wartime, and that we can decide that things will change in peacetime.
The line between war and peace is thin - what one person calls peace,
another calls war. In any case, it is impossible to maintain this distinc-
tion over a long term. We should assume that whatever we decide when
terror is threatening our security will linger many years after the terror is
over. Indeed, we judges must act with coherence and consistency. A
wrong decision in a time of war and terrorism plots a point that will
cause the judicial graph to deviate after the crisis passes.13
Moreover, democracy ensures us, as judges, independence. It
strengthens us - because of our political non-accountability - against
the fluctuations of public opinion. The real test of this independence
comes in situations of war and terrorism. The significance of our non-
accountability becomes clear in these situations when public opinion is
near-unanimous. Precisely in these times of war and terrorism, we
judges must hold fast to fundamental principles and values; we must
embrace our supreme responsibility to protect democracy and the consti-
tution. Lord Atkins's remarks on the subject of administrative detention
during World War II aptly describe these duties of the judge. In a
minority opinion in November 1941, he wrote:
In England amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. They
may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in
peace. It has always been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the
principles of liberty for which . . . we are now fighting, that the
judges . . . stand between the subject and any attempted encroach-
ments on his liberty by the executive, alert to see that any coercive
action is justified in law.14
13. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting):
"[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle
blow to liberty .... A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the
military emergency .... But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it
conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution
sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination
in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an
urgent need .... A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an
incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the
Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own
image."
See Patricia Hughes, Judicial Independence: Contemporary Pressures and Appropriate
Responses, 80 CAN. B. REV. 181, 186 (2001) (noting the general agreement that "judicial
independence is both an individual and a systemic, institutional or 'collective' quality").
14. See Liversidge v. Anderson, 3 All E.R. 338, 361 (1941) (Atkins, L.J., minority opinion).
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Admittedly, the struggle against terrorism turns our democracy into a
"defensive democracy" or even a "fighting democracy." Nonetheless,
this defense and this fight must not deprive our regime of its democratic
character. Judges in the highest court of the modem democracy should
act in the spirit of defensive democracy as opposed to uncontrolled
democracy.
2. IN BATTLE, THE LAWS ARE NOT SILENT
There is a well-known saying that when the cannons speak, the
Muses are silent. A similar idea was expressed by Cicero in his maxim
"Silent enim leges inter arma" (In battle, the laws are silent). 5 These
statements are regrettable. I hope they do not reflect the way things
are. 16 I am convinced they do not reflect the way things should be.
Every battle a country wages - against terrorism or against any other
enemy - must be done in accordance with rules and laws. On the inter-
national plane, these rules are of international law; on the domestic
plane, they are the rules of domestic law. There is always law according
to which the state must act. There are no black holes where there is no
law. 7 And the law needs Muses. We need the Muses most when the
cannons speak. We need laws most in times of war.18
During the Gulf War, Iraq fired missiles at Israel. Israel feared
chemical and biological warfare as well, so the government distributed
gas masks. A suit was brought against the military commander, and it
was argued that he distributed gas masks unequally in the West Bank.
We accepted the petitioner's argument. In my opinion, I wrote:
When the cannons speak, the Muses are silent. But even when the
cannons speak, the military commander must uphold the law. The
power of society to stand up against its enemies is based on the rec-
ognition that it is fighting for values that deserve protection. The rule
15. CICERO, PRO MILONE 16 (N.H. Watts trans., Harvard Univ. Press, 5th ed. 1972).
16. But cf WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUr ONE: Civil LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
224 (1998) (arguing that Cicero's approach reflects reality).
17. See Abbasi v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2002) EWCA Civ
1958: "(W)e do not find it possible to approach this claim for judicial review other than on the
basis that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles recognized by both jurisdictions
and by international law, Mr. Abbasi is at present arbitrarily detained in a 'legal black-hole'
(Lord Phillips M.R.).
18. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23 (2002): "In the
days since, I have been struck by how many Americans - and how many lawyers - seem to
have concluded that, somehow, the destruction of four planes and three buildings has taken us
back to a state of nature in which there are no laws or rules. In fact, over the years, we have
developed an elaborate system of domestic and international laws, institutions, regimes, and
decision-making procedures precisely so that they will be consulted and obeyed, not ignored, at a
time like this."
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of law is one of these values.' 9
This opinion sparked criticism. Some argued that the Supreme Court of
Israel had intervened in Israel's struggle against Iraq. I believe that this
criticism was unjustified. We did not intervene in military considera-
tions, for which the expertise and responsibility lies with the executive.
Rather, we intervened in considerations of equality, for which the exper-
tise and responsibility rest with us, as judges. Indeed, the struggle
against terrorism is not conducted outside the law but within the law
using tools that the law makes available to a democratic state. Terrorism
does not justify the neglect of accepted legal norms. This is how we
distinguish ourselves from the terrorists themselves. They act against
the law, by violating and trampling it. In its war against terrorism, a
democracy acts within the framework of the law and according to the
law. This principle was well expressed by Justice H. Cohen of the
Israeli Supreme Court more than twenty years ago, when he said:
What distinguishes the war of the State from the war of its enemies is
that the State fights while upholding the law, whereas its enemies
fight while violating the law. The moral strength and the objective
justification of the Government's war depend entirely on upholding
the laws of the State: by conceding this strength and this justification,
the Government serves the purposes of the enemy. Moral weapons
are no less important than any other weapon, and they are perhaps
more important. There is no weapon more moral than the rule of law.
Everyone who ought to know should be aware that the rule of law in
Israel will never yield to its enemies.2°
Indeed, the war against terrorism is a war of a law-abiding nation and
law-abiding citizens against lawbreakers. It is, therefore, not merely a
war of the state against its enemies; it is also a war of the law against its
enemies. A recent opinion of the Israeli Supreme Court addresses this
role of the rule of law as a primary actor in the context of terrorism. The
case involved armed terrorists and citizens who ensconced themselves in
the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, which is in the territory of the
Palestinian Authority, outside Israel. The Israeli army laid siege, trying
to force them to leave the church (precincts). The army claimed there
was a shortage of food and water. In the course of holding negotiations
with the army, the terrorists petitioned the Supreme Court. We consid-
ered the petition and applied the relevant rules of international law. In
doing so, I said:
Israel finds itself in a difficult war against rampant terrorism. It is
acting on the basis of its right to self-defense (see art. 51 of the
19. H.C. 168/91, Morcos v. Minister of Def., 45(1) P.D. 467, 470-71.
20. H.C. 320/80, Kwasana v. Minister of Def., 5(3) P.D. 113, 132.
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United Nations Charter). This fighting is not carried out in a norma-
tive vacuum. It is carried out according to the rules of international
law, which set out the principles and rules for waging war. The state-
ment that "when the cannons speak, the Muses are silent" is incor-
rect. . . . The reason underlying this approach is not merely
pragmatic, the result of political and normative reality. The reason
underlying this approach is much deeper. It is an expression of the
difference between a democratic State that is fighting for its survival
and the battle of terrorists who want to destroy it. The State is fight-
ing for and on behalf of the law. The terrorists are fighting against
and in defiance of the law. The war against terrorism is a war of the
law against those who seek to destroy it .... But it is more than this:
the State of Israel is a State whose values are Jewish and democratic.
We have established here a State that respects law, that achieves its
national goals and the vision of generations, and that does so while
recognizing and realizing human rights in general and human dignity
in particular; between these two there is harmony and agreement, not
conflict and alienation.2'
3. THE BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND
FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL
Democracies should conduct the struggle against terrorism with the
proper balance between two conflicting values and principles. On the
one hand, we must consider the values and principles relating to the
security of the state and its citizens. Human rights cannot justify under-
mining national security in every case and in all circumstances. Human
rights are not a stage for national destruction. The Constitution is not a
suicide pact. As I stated in one case:
A constitution is not a prescription for suicide, and civil rights are not
an altar for national destruction (cf. the remarks of Justice Jackson in
Terminiello v. Chicago). The laws of a people should be interpreted
on the basis of the assumption that it wants to continue to exist. Civil
rights derive from the existence of the State, and they should not be
made into a spade with which to bury it.22
On the other hand, we must consider the values and principles relating to
human dignity and freedom. National security cannot justify undermin-
ing human rights in every case and in all circumstances. National secur-
ity does not grant an unlimited license to harm the individual.
Democracies must find a balance between these conflicting values
21. H.C. 3451/02, Almadani v. IDF Commander in Judea & Samaria, 56(3) P.D. 30, 34-35.
22. C.A. 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Cent. Election Comm. For Eleventh Knesset, 39(2)
P.D. 225, 310. The judgment cited is Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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and principles. Neither side can rule alone. In one case, which dealt
with the legality of administrative detention, I wrote:
We cannot avoid - in a democracy aspiring to freedom and security
- a balance between freedom and dignity, and security. Human
rights may not become a tool for denying security to the public and
the State. A balance is required - a sensitive and difficult balance
- between the freedom and dignity of the individual, and national
security and public security.23
Every balance that is made between security and freedom will
impose certain limitations both on security and on freedom. A proper
balance will not be achieved when human rights are fully protected, as if
there were no terrorism. Similarly a proper balance will not be achieved
when national security is afforded full protection, as if there were no
human rights. The balance and compromise are the price of democracy.
Only a strong, safe and stable democracy may afford and protect human
rights, and only a democracy built on the foundations of human rights
can exist with security. It follows that the balance between security and
freedom does not reflect a lack of a clear position. On the contrary, the
proper balance between security and freedom is the result of a clear
position that recognizes the need for security and the need for human
rights. I discussed this in a case addressing whether the state may forci-
bly assign residents of an occupied territory to another place in the occu-
pied territory if such person poses a threat to the security of the territory.
I noted in the judgment that: "A delicate and sensitive balance is neces-
sary. That is the price of democracy. It is a high price, but worthwhile
to pay. It strengthens the state. It gives it a reason to fight."24
When I speak about the balance, I don't mean an external norma-
tive process that changes the scope of rights and the protection accorded
them because of terror. I mean the ordinary process that takes place
every day, when we address the relationship between individual rights
and the needs of society. In this latter process, rights are not absolute.
They may be limited to serve the needs of society. I do not have the
right to shout "fire" in a crowded theater. The threat of terrorism
increases the probability that serious damage may occur, which allows
the right to be limited. But note that we do not conduct two systems of
balancing, one for regular times, and an additional one under a threat of
terrorism. There is one balancing process, and terrorism determines the
physical conditions under which the balancing takes place.
When the court rules on the balance between security and freedom
during times of terrorist threats, it often encounters complaints from
23. Cr.A. 7048/97, Anonymous v. Minister of Def., 54(1) P.D. 721, 741.
24. H.C. 7015/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank, 56(6) P.D. 352, 383.
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both sides. The supporters of human rights argue that the court gives too
much protection to security and too little to human rights. The support-
ers of security argue that the court gives too much protection to human
rights and too little to security. Frequently, the persons making these
arguments read only the judicial conclusion without considering the
judicial reasoning that seeks to make a proper balance between the con-
flicting values and principles. None of this intimidates the judge. He
must and does rule according to his best understanding and conscience.25
Our point of departure in Israel has been that the doors of the
supreme court - which in Israel serves as court of first instance for
complaints against the executive branch - are open to anyone wishing
to complain about the activities of a public authority. There are no black
holes where there is judicial review.
The open door approach is expressed in a number of ways. First, it
is very rare that the court would close its doors on grounds of nonjusti-
ciability. At times the state may argue that most of its counterterrorism
activities are beyond the reach of the judiciary because they take place
outside the country, because they constitute an act of state, or because
they are political in nature. All these arguments were made before us in
the Israeli Supreme Court, and most of them were rejected when human
rights are directly affected. Thus, we have ruled on petitions concerning
the power of the state to arrest suspected terrorists 6 and the conditions
of their confinement.27 We have ruled on petitions concerning the rights
of suspected terrorists to legal representation and the means by which
they may be interrogated.28
Second, the court opens its doors to anyone claiming that civil
rights have been violated. Everyone has standing. This is the general
approach of the court in time of peace.29 We apply it also in times of
terror. Thus, civil rights associations often come to us in defense of
human rights of those sectors of society that most people do not wish to
protect - including, of course, suspected terrorists.
Third, our judgments regarding many of the terrorist cases are
based on international law. Thus, for example, in a recent case the issue
25. See H.C. 428/86, Barzilai v. Gov't of Israel, 40(3) P.D. 505, 585 (Barak, J., dissenting).
26. See H.C. 3239/02, Maraab v. Commander in Judea and Samaria, 57(2) P.D. 349.
27. See H.C. 3278/02, The Center for the Def. of the Individual (established by Dr. Lota
Salzberger) v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank, 57(1) P.D. 385; H.C. 5591/02 Yassin v.
Commander of Kziot Military Camp, 57(1) P.D. 403; H.C. 253/88 Sajadia v. Minister of Def.,
42(3) P.D. 801.
28. Maarab, 57(2) P.D. at 377 (the right to legal representation). See H.C. 5100/94, Public
Comm. Against Torture v. State of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817 (means of interrogation).
29. The Israeli Supreme Court's general approach is that in cases of serious violation of the
rule of law, everyone in Israel has standing. For an analysis of this approach, see Barak, supra
note 1, at 106.
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was whether the state could relocate inhabitants of the West Bank to
Gaza.30 We decided that such inhabitants could be relocated, but only
upon convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that such
person will present a real danger of harm to the security of the occupied
territory. The state cannot assign residence of innocent persons. In
deciding so, we relied exclusively on humanitarian provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, which deals with assigned residence and
internment.
In all these decisions - and there have been hundreds of this kind
- we recognized, on the one hand, the power of the state to protect its
security and the security of its citizens. On the other hand, we empha-
sized that the rights of every individual must be preserved, including
those of the individual suspected of being a terrorist. The balancing
point between the conflicting values and principles is not fixed. It dif-
fers from case to case and from issue to issue. The damage to national
security caused by a given terrorist and the nation's response to the act
affects the way in which the freedom and dignity of the individual are
protected. Thus, for example, when the response to terrorism was the
destruction of the terrorists' house, we discussed the need to act propor-
tionately. We concluded that only when human life has been lost is it
permissible to destroy the buildings where the terrorists lived, and even
then the goal may not be collective punishment (which is forbidden in
the area under military occupation). Such destruction may be used only
for preventive purposes, and only if the terrorist himself was living
there. There is, of course, a right to prior hearing, unless actualizing it
would interfere with military activity. Obviously, there is no right to a
hearing in the middle of a military operation.3' But when the time and
place permit - and there is no fear of interfering with security forces
that are fighting terrorism - a right to a hearing should be honored.32
When it was necessary to use administrative detention against terrorists,
we interpreted the relevant legislation to the effect that the purpose of
the laws of administrative detention is two-fold: "on the one hand, pro-
tecting national security; on the other hand, protecting the dignity and
freedom of every person."33 We added that "protection of national
security is a social necessity that every State tries to achieve. Within
this framework, democratic countries that aspire to freedom recognize
30. See H.C. 7015/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank, 56(6) P.D. 352.
31. See H.C. 5510/92, Turkeman v. Minister of Def., 48(1) P.D. 217. Harsh criticism has
been leveled at this opinion and others like it. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF
JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 160-61 (2002).
32. See H.C. 6696/02, Adal Sado Amar v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank, 56(6) P.D. 110.
33. Cr.A. 7048/97, Anonymous v. Minister of Def., 54(1) P.D. 721, 740.
20031
HeinOnline  -- 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 135 2003-2004
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the 'institution' of administrative detention."34 We also held that
"understanding and protecting ...freedom and dignity extend also to
the freedom and dignity of someone whom the state wishes to detain in
administrative detention."35 Against this background, we held that "it is
possible to allow - in a democratic state that aspires to freedom and
security - the administrative detention of a person who is regarded per-
sonally as a danger to national security, but this possibility should not be
extended to the detention of a person who is not regarded personally as a
danger to national security, and who is merely a 'bargaining chip.' 36
The fight against terrorism requires the interrogation of terrorists.
Such questioning must be conducted according to the ordinary rules of
interrogation. Physical force must not be used; specifically, the persons
being interrogated must not be tortured.37 A democracy - even a
defensive or fighting democracy - should not bureaucratize the use of
torture. It may, however, view it as defensible ex post facto.
4. THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Judicial review of the war against terrorism by its nature raises the
question of the timing and scope of judicial intervention. There should
not be a theoretical difference between applying judicial review at the
time that the state is under terror threats or after the terror is gone. In
practice, however, as Chief Justice Rehnquist correctly noted, the timing
of judicial intervention affects its content. As he stated, "Courts are
more prone to uphold wartime claims of civil liberties after the war is
over."38 In light of this recognition, Chief Justice Rehnquist goes on to
ask whether it would be better to abstain from judicial adjudication dur-
ing warfare.39 The answer, from my point of view - and I am sure,
also from the Chief Justice's point of view - is clear: Both of us will
adjudicate a question when it is presented to us. We will not defer it
until the war on terror is over, because the fate of a democracy and
human beings may hang in the balance. Protection of human rights
would be bankrupt if, during combat, courts - consciously or uncon-
sciously - decided to review the behavior of the executive branch only
after the period of emergency ended.
Furthermore, the decision should not rest on issuing general decla-
rations about the balance of human rights and the need for security.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 741.
37. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817,
835.
38. Rehnquist, supra note 16, at 222.
39. Id.
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Rather, the judicial ruling must impart guidance and direction in the spe-
cific case before the court. Justice Brennan correctly noted, "[A]bstract
principles announcing the applicability of civil liberties during times of
war and crises are ineffectual when a war or crisis comes along unless
the principles are fleshed out by a detailed jurisprudence explaining how
those civil liberties will be sustained against particularized national
security concerns." 4
From a judicial review point of view, the situation in Israel is
unique. Petitions from suspected terrorists reach the supreme court -
which has exclusive jurisdiction on the matter - in real time. The judi-
cial adjudication takes place not only during combat, but often while the
events being reviewed are taking place. For example, the question of
whether the General Security Service may use extraordinary methods of
interrogation (including what has been classified as torture) did not
come before us in the context of a criminal case in which we had to rule,
ex post, on the admissibility of a suspected terrorist's confession.4'
Rather, the question arose at the beginning of his interrogation. At the
start of the interrogation, the suspect's lawyer came before us and
claimed, on the basis of his past experience, that the General Security
Service would use force against his client. We summoned the state's
representative - the same day or the next day - and we heard argu-
ments, and made a decision in real time. In another case, more than ten
years ago, the state sought to deport 400 suspected terrorists to Lebanon.
Human rights associations petitioned us. I was the justice on call at the
time. Late that night, I issued an interim order enjoining the deportation.
At the time, the deportees were in automobiles en route to Lebanon.
The order immediately halted the deportation. Only after a long hearing
throughout the night, including testimony by the army chief-of-staff, did
we invalidate the deportation order. We ruled that the state breached its
obligation to grant the deportees the right to a hearing before deporting
them, and we ordered a post factum right to a hearing.4"
Our basic premise is that the court should not adopt a position on
the question of what are the efficient security measures for the war
against terrorism. As I said in one case: "This court will not adopt any
40. Brennan, supra note 11, at 19.
41. See H.C. 4054/95, Pub. Comm'n Against Torture in Israel. v. Gov't of Israel, 43(4) P.D.
817.
42. See H.C. 5510/92, Turkeman v. Minister of Def., 48(1) P.D. 217. Our opinion was
criticized. The criticism was that we permitted post-factum hearings to take place. The critics
thought that we should have avoided the deportation because it was done without a hearing and
without the authority to deport. We decided that his last issue needed to be raised in the hearings:
See Kretzmer, supra note 31, at 184-86.
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position about the manner of conducting the war."4 3 For example, in
Church of the Nativity, a petition was filed while negotiations were
being held between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian
Authority regarding a solution to the problem. I wrote that in my judg-
ment "this court is not conducting the negotiations, and is not a partici-
pant in them. The national responsibility in this respect lies with the
executive and those acting on its behalf."'  Indeed, the efficiency of the
security measures is a matter that is in the proper jurisdiction of the
other branches of government. As long as the other branches are acting
within the framework of the "zone of reasonableness," 45 there is no basis
for judicial intervention.
Often the court will encounter the argument from the executive that
security considerations led to an action of the government, followed by a
request that the court be satisfied with this statement. Such a request
should not be granted. "Security considerations" are not magic words.
The court must insist on hearing the specific security considerations that
prompted the government's actions. The court must be persuaded that
the security considerations actively motivated the government's action
and were not merely a pretext. Finally, the court must be convinced that
the security measures adopted were the available measures least damag-
ing to human rights. Indeed, in several of the many security cases that
the supreme court heard, senior army commanders and heads of the
security services testified before us. Only if we were convinced that the
security consideration was the dominant one, and that the security mea-
sure was proportionate, did we dismiss the challenge against the security
action.46 In dismissing challenges to security actions, we should not be
nafve or cynical. We should analyze the evidence before us objectively.
In the case dealing with review under the Geneva Convention, of the
state's decision to assign Arab residents from the West Bank to the Gaza
Strip, I noted that:
In exercising judicial review . . . we do not make ourselves into
security experts. We do not replace the military commander's secur-
ity considerations with those of our own. We take no position on the
way security issues are handled. Our job is to maintain boundaries,
and to guarantee the existence of conditions that restrict the military
43. H.C. 3114/02, Barakeh v. Minister of Def., 56(3) P.D. 11, 16.
44. H.C. 3451/02, Almadani v. IDF Commander in Judea & Samaria, 56(3) P.D. 30, 36.
45. For an analysis of this concept, see Barak, supra note 1, at 145-47.
46. In Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Rehman, No. UKHL 47, 2001 WL 1135176 (H.L.
Oct. 11, 2001) (U.K.), Lord Hoffman noted that "the judicial arm of government [needs] to
respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist
activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to national security." I hope the meaning of
these comments is limited to the general principle that a court determines not the means of
fighting terrorism but rather the lawfulness of the means employed.
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commander's discretion.... We do not, however, replace the com-
mander's discretion with our own. We insist upon the legality of the
military commander's exercise of discretion and that it fall into the
range of reasonableness, determined by the relevant legal norms
applicable to the issue.4 7
Is it proper for judges to review the legality of the fight on terror-
ism? Many argue that the court should not become involved in these
matters. These arguments are heard from both ends of the political spec-
trum. On one side, critics argue that judicial review undermines secur-
ity; on the other side, critics argue that judicial review gives legitimacy
to actions of the government authorities in their war against terrorism.
Both arguments are unacceptable. As to the argument that judicial
review undermines security: Judicial review of the legality of the war
on terrorism may make the war against terrorism harder in the short
term. Judicial review, however, fortifies and strengthens the people in
the long term. The rule of law is a central element in national security.
As I wrote in a case of pre-trial pardon given to the heads of the General
Security service who committed crimes against terrorists:
There is no security without law. The rule of law is an element of
national security. Security requires us to find proper tools for interro-
gation. Otherwise, the General Security Service will be unable to
fulfill its purpose. The strength of the Service lies in the public's
confidence in it. Its strength lies in the court's confidence in it. If
security considerations are decisive, the public will have no confi-
dence, and the court will have no confidence in the security service
and the lawfulness of its interrogations. Without this confidence, the
branches of the state cannot function. This is the case with regard to
public confidence in the courts, and it is the case with regard to pub-
lic confidence in the other branches of state.48
I concluded my opinion in that case with the following:
It is said that there was a dispute between King James I and Justice
Coke. The question was, whether the king could take matters, in the
province of the judiciary, into his own hands and decide them him-
self. At first, Justice Coke tried to persuade the king that judging
requires expertise that the king did not have. The king was not con-
vinced. Then Justice Coke rose and said: "Quod rex non debet esse
sub homine, sed sub Deo et sub lege." The king should not be subject
to man, but subject to God and the law. Let it be so.49
The security considerations entertained by the branches of the state are
subject to "God and the law." In the final analysis, this subservience
47. H.C. 7015/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank, 56(6) P.D. 352, 375-76.
48. H.C. 428/86, Barzilai v. Gov't of Israel, 40(3) P.D. 505, 622 (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 623.
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does not weaken democracy but actually strengthens it. It makes the
struggle against terrorism worthwhile. With regard to considerations of
legitimacy: To the extent that legitimacy by the court means that the acts
of the state are lawful, the court fulfills its traditional role. Both when
the state wins and when the state loses, the rule of law and democracy
benefit. It should be remembered that the main effect of the judicial
decision does not occur in the individual instance that comes before it.
Rather the main effect occurs in determining the general norms accord-
ing to which the governmental authorities act, and in establishing the
deterrent effect this norm will have. The test of the rule of law arises not
merely in the few cases brought before the court, but also in the many
cases that are not brought before it, since government authorities are
aware of the ruling of the court and act accordingly. The argument that
judicial review somehow validates the governmental action does not
take into account the nature of judicial review. In hearing a case, the
court does not examine the wisdom of the war against terrorism, but
only the legality of the acts taken in furtherance of the war. The court
does not ask itself if it would have adopted the security measures that
were adopted, if it were responsible for security. Instead, the court asks
if a reasonable person responsible for security would be within the
bounds of the law to adopt the security measures that were adopted.
Thus, the court does not express agreement with the means adopted but
rather fulfills its role by reviewing the constitutionality and legality of
the executive acts.
Naturally, one must not go from one extreme to the other. One
must recognize that the court will not solve the problem of terrorism. It
is a problem to be addressed by the other branches of government. The
role of the court is to ensure the constitutionality and legality of the fight
against terrorism. It must ensure that the war against terrorism is con-
ducted within the framework of the law and not outside it. This is the
court's contribution to the struggle of democracy to survive. In my
opinion, it is an important contribution, one that aptly reflects the judi-
cial role in a democracy. Realizing this rule during a war against terror-
ism is difficult. We cannot and would not want to escape from this
difficulty, as I noted in one case:
The decision has been laid before us, and we must stand by it. We
are obligated to preserve the legality of the regime even in difficult
decisions. Even when the artillery booms.., law exists and acts and
decides what is permitted and what is forbidden, what is legal and
what is illegal. And when law exists, courts also exist to adjudicate
what is permitted and what is forbidden, what is legal and what is
illegal. Some of the public will applaud our decision; others will
oppose it. Perhaps neither side will have read our reasoning. We
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have done our part, however. That is our role and our obligation as
judges.5 °
I regard myself as a judge who is sensitive to his role in a democ-
racy. I take the tasks imposed on me - protecting the constitution and
democracy - seriously. Despite criticism often heard - and it fre-
quently descends to personal attacks and threats of violence from
extremists - I have continued on this path for many years. I hope that
by doing so, I am serving my legal system properly. Indeed, as judges
in the highest court, we must continue on our path according to our
consciences. We, as judges, have a North Star that guides us - the
fundamental values and principles of constitutional democracy. A heavy
responsibility rests on our shoulders. Even in hard times, we must
remain true to ourselves. I discussed this in the opinion considering
whether extraordinary methods of interrogation may be used against a
terrorist in a "ticking bomb" situation:
Deciding these applications weighed heavily on this Court. True,
from the legal perspective, the road before us is smooth. We are,
however, part of Israeli society. Its problems are known to us and we
live its history. We are not isolated in an ivory tower. We live the
life of this country. We are aware of the harsh reality of terrorism in
which we are, at times, immersed. Our apprehension that this deci-
sion will hamper the ability to properly deal with terrorists and terror-
ism disturbs us. We are, however, judges. Our fellow-citizens
demand that we act according to the law. This is also the same stan-
dard that we set for ourselves. When we sit at trial, we stand on
trial.
51
50. H.C. 2161/96, Rabbi Said Sharif v. Military Commander, 50(4) P.D. 485, 491.
51. H.C. 4054/95, Pub. Comm'n Against Torture in Israel. v. Gov't of Israel, 43(4) P.D. 817,
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